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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOE TOTORICA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
nay E .. Thomas, et al, 
RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE. IN-
f'URANCE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIE~F 
NATURE, OF THE CAS.E 
Gase. No. 
10,152 
·j 
l 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District 
Court wherein it was determined that the plaintiff's 
(Totorica) lien for labor and materials is prior in time 
and right to defendant and appellant's (Reliance) 
mortgage upon the premises. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The matter came on for trial before the District 
Court for foreclosure of plaintiff's lien for labor and 
materials and Reliance contended that its mortgage,· 
which was recorded two weeks before plaintiff's delayed 
lien notice, was prior in time and right to the lien of 
the plaintiff; that plaintiff had completed his contract 
and suspended his work for more than thirty days and 
had not brought his action to enforce the lien within 
twelve months after such suspension of work. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal, 'defendant seeks to have its mortgage 
declared first in time and right ahead of the late-filed 
mechanic's lien of plaintiff. Also, to determine whether 
this action was filed within the twelve-month period 
required by Section 38-1-11, UCA 1953. 
STATE1\fENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's mortgage was dated March 15, 19'62, 
and. executed by Daniel G. Thomas and Bette E. Thomas, 
the then record title owners of the property, to secure 
a promissory note in favor of appellant and such was 
duly recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on March 23, 1962. ·The plaintiff's Notice of · 
Lien was not recorded until April 10, 1962, in the Office 
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3 
of the Salt Lake County Recorder. At that time, and 
now, DaniPl G. Thomas and his wife were, and still are, 
the owners of record of such real estate. At the time 
of pre-trial the plaintiff dismissed his lien foreclosure 
adion against said owners of the property, Daniel G. 
Thoma~, et ux. (R. 26) 
The Notice of Lien recites a written contract be-
twPPn plaintiff and Ray E. Thomas ·(a brother to Daniel 
G. Thomas, but not an owner of record) and asserts that 
the first work was done on June 1, 1961, but that the 
last work was not done until March 31, 1962. A $3,000 
unpaid balance is asserted by the plaintiff on a $12,000 
contract. The undisputed facts are that Daniel G. 
Thomas and his wife and family moved into the property 
on or about September 1, 1961, and have continuously 
occupied the premises since then. 
~The record further shows that except for trifling, 
insignificant items of work done since September, 1961, 
the construction of the residence and completion of the 
contract was finished in September, 1961. Plaintiff testi-
fied that he had certain minor items of work done and 
materials furnished subsequent to that date, but no work 
was done on the contract itself between the end of 
October and the end of December, 1961, a period of more 
than 30 days. 
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4 
Though the work was suspended for more than said 
30-day period during the last two months of 1961, this 
action was not filed until March 28, 1963, a period of 
more than twelve months after suspension of work there-
under for a period of thirty days referred to in Section 
38-1-11, UCA 19·53. Reference to the details in the 
record showing such suspension of work will be made 
in the Argument hereafter. 
The time schedule, so far as is here pertinent in 
the issues, reads as follows: 
May 28, 1961 
September, 1961 
Last part of Octo-
ber or first part 
of November: 
November 
January 10, 1962 
Contract for construction of home 
between Ray E. Thomas and plain-
tiff; (Exh. P-3) 
Daniel Thomas moved into com-
pleted house. 
Poured concrete in corner of win-
dow. (R-76-77) 
"We hanged the storm doors in 
November." (R-75) (The record 
appears to be clear that such were 
not included in the specifications 
and they were procured and or-
dered by the tenant Dan Thomas 
and paid for by him.) (R-76) 
Front door threshold. (R-75 and 
77) (Only a short piece of wood 
under door) 
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5 
January 19, 1962 Insulation into attic completed. 
(R-58) No cost stated. 
FdH·uary 12, 1962 Rain guttering (R-58) No in con-
tract. 
FPbruary 1~, 1962 Aluminum mullion. (R-60) $2.83 
plus one hour. 
Mareh 15, 1962 
March 23, 1962 
March 30, 1962 
April, 1962 
~\pril10, 1962 
March 28, 1963 
Note and mortgage executed by 
Thomas to Reliance (Exh. P-1 and 
P-2') 
Mortgage recorded, Book 1903, 
Page 35,3. 
Plastering of foundation (R-63-65) 
($25.00) 
Painting. R-6:6067 ( $35.00) 
Notice of Lien recorded (Exh. P-4) 
Action filed to foreclose lien. 
The rain guttering was not a part of the original 
contract and it, and the other items done several months 
after completion of the contract, were at the insistence 
and request of Daniel G. Thomas, not the one with 
whom the contract was made. 
The court, in pursuance of pre-trial order entered 
in this case and case No. 145329, entitled Reliance Na-
tional Life Insurance Company vs. Daniel 'G. Thomas, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
et al, directed that both matters be heard consecutively 
by the trial court as the second noted case was the 
morgage foreclosure proceeding brought by appellant. 
The determination of the priority of the mortgage of 
the plaintiff's mechanic's lien in the present proceeding 
(case No. 142254) should control in both cases. In the 
second case all defendants defaulted and evidence was 
duly adduced at the pre-trial and, hence, carried forward 
to the trial date, showing the execution and delivery of 
the mortgage referred to above and the fact of default 
therein by the defendants; and the District Court there-
upon directed foreclosure on the said mortgage action 
against the premises. Such order was made subject to 
the priority of the plaintiff's mechanic's lien as deter-
mined in this Case No. 142254 now under appeal. 
·The plaintiff failed to present any evidence that 
the Reliance mortgage was not taken and recorded in 
complete good faith, without notice of plaintiff's claims. 
Said mortgage was recorded March ·2.3, 19·62, prior to 
any Notice given by plaintiff April 10, 1962. The home 
had been occupied since September, 19·61, and none of 
the insignificant items done by plaintiff in 1962 would 
alert or give notice to a mortgage of an uncompleted 
construction contract upon which lien rights might still 
exist. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RELIANCE IS A BONA FIDE MORTGAGEE WITHOUT 
NOTICE 0 F PLAINTIFF'S LATER FILED LIEN. 
The recording statutes of Utah have been estab-
lished to protect purchasers and mortgagees against 
prior liens and encumbrances on realty. Reliance has 
dealt with this property in absolute good faith. The note 
and mortgage were executed by the record title owner 
who was in possession. No visible construction was in 
progress when the mortgage was taken in March 1962. 
The owner had occupied the completed dwelling since 
September 19'61 - six months prior to the inspection 
and mortgage date. 
Section 57-3-2 U.C.A. 1953 provides that the record-
ing of the mortgage "imparts notice to all persons of the 
contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mort-
gagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and 
take with notice." This statutory rule, plus the pre-
sumption of authenticity which attends the mortgage, 
affirms the priority and good faith position of Reliance. 
K either at the pre-trial nor at the trial was any 
attack made by plaintiff upon this mortgage. If the 
Court is to consider the equities between the parties, 
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Reliance as the innocent mortgagee must have first claim 
upon the property. 
Plaintiff, from the time the premises were com-
pleted and occupied in September 1961, had 80 days 
within which to file his Notice of Lien. Had such been 
done, no mortgage would have been taken and no loss 
suffered by Reliance. Plaintiff has slept on his rights 
as to the liening of the premises and permitted Reliance 
to suffer this unfortunate circumstances now imposed by 
the District Court. 
~That plaintiff knew of his earlier right to lien the 
property back in December 1961 is evidenced by the 
registered mail letter delivered to Mr. Ray 'Thomas (not 
in possession or the owner of record) as shown by 
Exh. D'-10. This calls attention to the unpaid balance 
owing for construction of 1916 South 16th East and says, 
"If satisfactory arrangements are not made by Decem-
ber 26, 1961, lien will be filed to protect our interests." 
The fact of completion of the contract must be inferred 
from this as no right of lien exists in an original con-
tractor such as plaintiff unless and until there has been 
"completion of the contract," 38-1-7 U.C.A. 1953. 
No lien notice was ever filed until more than three 
and one-half months after that letter and more than two 
weeks after the Reliance mortgage had been recorded. 
A bona fide mortgagee is entitled to protection in its 
priority rights under these circumstances. 
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11:xhibit P-2, the Mortgage, has within it the follow-
ing paragraph: 
"2. He is lawfully seized of said premises in 
fee simple and has good and lawful right to mort-
gage, sell and convey the same, and will warrant 
and defend the same against all claims and de-
mands whatsoever. The only liens, charges, or 
encumbrances against said property are as fol-
lows: None." 
Thus, Reliance not only had the benefit of the recording 
statutes to protect its mortgage priority, but the repre-
sentation of the record owner, who was in possession, 
that there were no other liens or encumbrances. These 
are the things which a normal, prudent mortgagee would 
look for to be certain its mortgage would be a first lien 
on the residence. Plaintiff should be estopped from as-
serting at this late date his purported lien, as between 
him and Reliance. As to the owners, his lien rights are 
not under appeal. 
POINT II 
BURDEN OF PROOF FALLS ON PLAINTIFF ASSERT-
ING DELAYED MECHANIC'S LIEN, TO ESTABLISH 
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIRE-
MENTS. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF LIEN WAS NOT FILED 
WITHIN THE TIME OR IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY 
LAW SO AS TO PERMIT IT TO RELATE BACK AHEAD 
OF THE PRIOR RECORDED RELIANCE MORTGAGE. 
Absent some special statutory amnesty, plaintiff 
will concede that its lien rights, being tardily filed, are 
subsequent in time and right to the Reliance mortgage 
already of record. Section 38-1-5 U.C.A. 19·53 purports 
to relate liens back to the date of commencement of the 
building (back to June 1961). To take advantage of 
this legislative ex post facto, plaintiff must comply 
strictly with the lien statutes. 
As these lien rights asserted by plaintiff are in 
derogation of the common law, strict construction of the 
statutes becomes the rule ; and, in addition, plaintiff 
must establish complete adherence to those statutory 
prerequisites. Equitably, the plaintiff cannot justify a 
priority over the prior recorded Reliance mortgage. The 
burden of proof is on plaintiff to show an escape route 
from his dilatory lien recording. 
Permit us to test the lien of plaintiff against the 
statutory requirements. The contract (Exh. P-3) is 
dated May 28, 1961, the Notice of Lien (Exh. P -4) refers 
to a written contract dated March 31, 1961. First work 
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was .rune 1, 1961 and the completed house was delivered 
into possession of owner in September 19'61. Plaintiff 
wa~ an "original contractor" and, hence, had 80 days 
"aftpr completion of his contract." (Sec. 38-1-7) 
This 80-day period would take plaintiff to about 
DecemlH'r 10, 1961, dependent upon the time in Septem-
ber wht>n he finished the house and delivered possession. 
The Court is fortunate in having corroborating evidence 
from the plaintiff himself in the Exhibit D·-10. This is 
his registered mail letter to Mr. Thomas dated Decem-
ber 15, 1961, which says that if the balance owing is 
not paid or satisfactory arrangements made by Decem-
ber 26, 1961, then the lien would be filed. By this letter, 
plaintiff is, in essence, acknowledging that he had here-
tofore cmnpleted his contract (or he would not have 
any lien rights). Thus, once again, his time for filing 
Notice of Lien could not conceiveably extend to April 
10, 1962 when he finally recorded his Notice. 
The few insignificant items of work done after 
September 1961 are itemized above. Under the rule of 
Trilcox v. Cloward, 56 P. 2d 88, Utah 503, trivial 
or minor adjustments done after the main work may 
not be used by contractor to extend his lien rights. In 
X ovember they hung storm doors, but these are not 
in the plans or specifications and were at the request 
of Daniel Thomas, not the one contracting for the con-
struction. On January 10, 1961, the front door thresh-
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hold was installed. Anyone knows that such is a small 
piece of wood which goes under the door to keep out 
drafts and would probably cost about $2.00, though no 
figure was given. Similar minor items are detailed by 
plaintiff in his testimony. 
Working back from the recording date on the lien 
notice (April 10, 1962.) for 80 days, we would go back 
to January 20, 19'62. During this 80-day period only 
four things were done: 
February 12 
F'ebruary 12 
March 30 
April 
Rain guttering - not in the con-
tract; 
Aluminum mullion in corner win-
dow - $2.83 (Exh. P-·6) plus one 
hour; 
Plastering the foundation- $25.00 
Painting carport - $35.00 
All of these could have been done back in September 
1961. The contractor either had no direct duty on these, 
delayed them solely for his own convenience or to try 
to reestablish his lost lien rights. These do not qualify 
for any more than a lien right for about $66.00. New 
work not in the contract does not relate back lien rights. 
It seems significant to us that another exhibit pre-
pared by plaintiff himself probably speaks eloquently 
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ag-ainst him. Ho vohmtarily brought in his account book 
(l~~xh. P-23). On the very page where the exhibit mark-
ing is made, we find all of his expenditures for materials 
on the 1916 South 16th East. These records in his 
handwriting show the last expenditure by him to he on 
November 21, 1961. None of his pretended later items 
are reflected. This account book confirms that the con-
tract had been completed well in advance of November 
1961. 
Exhibit P-24, also presented by plaintiff, contains 
this language, "Jobs Finish 19,61 hut bill paid 19r62." 
Then it contains three references to awnings and insula-
tion for 1916 South 16th East. Hence, again in his own 
hand, the plaintiff has confirmed our position that the 
contract was completed in 19·61. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof that he has com-
plied fully with the lien statutes of Utah to permit 
this Notice of April 10, 1962, to relate back to June 
1961, the date of first work on this small house. The 
time schedules all refer back to the "completion of his 
contract" date for the commencement of the 80-day lien 
filing. Everything, except for plaintiff's belated at-
tempts to rejuvinate a dead lien, demonstrate that the 
home was completed in September 1961: 
(a) Home occupied September 1961; 
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(b) Account book (Exh. P-23); 
·(c) 196,2 accounts (Exh. P-24); 
(d) Registered mail notice in December (Exh. 
Dr-10), 
At a fairly recent date, this Court reviewed the lien 
laws carefully and held in Utah S a,vings & Loan vs. 
Mecham, 366 P. (2d) 598, 12 Ut. (2d) 335, that the liens 
are "purely statutory, not contractual, and none can be 
acquired unless the claimant has complied with the 
statutory provisions creating the lien." 
We urge strongly that the plaintiff has failed to 
show by his proof such compliance with the statute. 
The contract was "completed" in 19,61 and no Notice 
of Lien was filed within 80 days. No stretch of the 
rule in favor of the plaintiff is appropriate here because 
of the innocent nature of Reliance in loaning the money 
and taking and recording its mortgage on a home appar-
ently fully completed many, many months before . .As 
we are contesting priorities, the Court should properly 
leave plaintiff to his personal remedy against Mr. Ray 
Thomas, the one with whom he contracted. The judg-
ment for the unpaid sum is not attacked herein. 
In passing, we call to the 'Court's attention the 
unique procedural position adopted by plaintiff. He 
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has di~mi~~C'd the case as against the owners of record 
(mortgagors) Daniel Thomas, et ux. How can he hope 
to have a valid forecloure of his purported lien without 
the record title holders in the case~ Apparently, he had 
PlPrted to rely upon the credit of Ray ·Thomas with 
whom he has contracted. 
Another procedural defect is apparent. Section 
38-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 requires the filing of a lis pendens 
and states that the lien shall be void as to persons not 
parties. Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed out. the 
record title owners, as noted above, so no valid fore-
closure could be ordered by the District Court. The 
reeord is devoid of any evidence of a lis pendens being 
Pxecuted or filed. 
A request for a Finding clearly spelling out the 
extraordinary dismissal of the record title owners was 
presented (R-30) by this appellant, Reliance. ·The trial 
Court failed to make any Finding though the pre-trial 
order (R-26) clearly recites plaintiff's dismissal as 
against the said record title owners, Daniel G. and 
Bette E. Thomas. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE HIS ACTION TO FORE-
CLOSE HIS LIEN WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY SEC-
TION 38-1-11, UCA 1953. 
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Should the Court deem the preceed.ing three Points 
insufficient to reverse the Judgment herein as to prior-
ities of the Reliance mortgage and plaintiff's asserted 
lien, still this last point is fatal to plaintiff's cause of 
action. Because of the preemptive character of the lien 
laws and, particularly, the "relating back" language, the 
Legislature imposed a twelve month limitation for action 
on a lien. 
This twelve-month period starts (Sec. 38-1-11 
U.C.A. 19'5,3) : 
(a) completion of the original contract 
or 
(b) the suspension of work thereunder for a 
period of thirty days. 
No doubt, the Legislature had in mind situations 
just as have developed in our present case. It was not 
intended that a contractor could trap the unwary or 
even the prudent mortgagee or purchaser. If a con-
tractor was not paid, he must file his lien within 80 
days; but he must file his lis pendens and he must file 
his action within twelve months after either completion 
or suspension of work for thirty days. 
As we have discussed the "completion" phase above 
in regards to the 80 day lien filing period, we will not 
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rPpeat the details here. But we must call to your atten-
tion the fact that the home apparently completed and 
o<·cnpied in September 19·61 and this action was not 
fi l~·d tmtil March 28, 1963, 18 months after apparent 
<'ompletion. 
We turn now to the alternate, but equally valid, 
~tarting date for the running of the 12 month limitation. 
The statute sets this time as "or the suspension of work 
thereunder for a period of thirty days." No dispute 
exists in the record on a suspension of work for more 
than thirty days. We refer you back to the schedule in 
the statement of facts and call to your attention the 
lapse from November 1961 to January 10, 1962. Actu-
ally, the November work was on storm door for Daniel 
Thomas and not a part of the contract and so, in fact, 
the time runs from October 19·61, when the corner win-
dow sill was poured, until January 10, 19'62, when the 
threshhold was installed for the front door. 
"\V ork on this house was undeniably suspended for 
over thirty days. Plaintiff had delivered possession of 
the completed home in September 19·61. He testified 
that thereafter he was building a separate and entirely 
different home next door. Apparently, he may have 
attended to the few minor items in 1962 as an accomo-
dation for n!r. Daniel Thomas but not a part of his 
contract on the home at issue. 
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This same statute preserves for plaintiff his per-
sonal action for debt against persons for whom labor 
and materials are furnished. We make no complaint 
about that and no appeal is taken from the personal 
judgment for the unpaid balance on his contract with 
Mr. Ray Thomas. 
Reliance, as appellant rn this matter, respectfully 
submits to the Court that the trial court erred in not 
finding that the cause of action of he plaintiff was 
barred hy the statute for either or both of the reasons 
that the action to foreclose the lien was not filed within 
one year after completion of the contract or was not 
filed within one year after a 30-day suspension of work. 
This defense was pleaded at the very inception and was 
maintained throughout the trial and restated in the 
objections to the proposed findings that had been sub-
mitted to the Court. As this Court stated in Langton 
Lime and Cement Co. v. Peery, 159· Pac. 49, 48 Ut. 112, 
an action to enforce a mechanic's lien is an equity case. 
Thus, this Court may fully review the facts as well 
as the conclusions before the trial court and determine 
with appellant that the trial court erred in permitting 
the mechanic's lien to have priority ahead of the Reli-
ance mortgage which was taken and recorded in good 
faith. 
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CONCLUSION 
The mortgage financing of residences both on new 
construction and existing construction is a vital element 
in the growth and development of Utah. Utah has long 
prided itself as being a state of home owners rather than 
mere tPnants and we believe that the decisions of this 
court have fostered that growth. The i:nd-qstry is 
d('pendent upon a stability of law so that the priority 
of mortgages will not be a matter of speculation and 
conjecture. Here the builder of this home delivered 
possession in September of 19·61 but waited until April 
of 1962 before filing his lien for the unpaid $a,ooo 
balance and until March of 19·63 before commencing an 
action to foreclose that pretended lien~ His dilatory 
attempt to assert the lien has led an innocent mortgagee 
into financing this home in reliance upon the apparent 
completion of the dwelling more than six months before 
the mortgage was taken. Not only would it be inequit-
able and unjust to permit this late filed lien to relate 
bark ahead of the mortgage, but it would also create 
a precedent which would inhibit the normal mortgage 
financing of dwellings and, to that extent, stifle the 
natural growth and development of home ownership. 
In reversing the District Court solely on the issue 
of priority, your Court is not leaving the builder with-
out his recourse. The Legislature has spelled out his 
rights as against the property owner. Though plaintiff 
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has voluntarily dismissed the case against the true 
owner, thereby waiving his rights against the property, 
we believe, yet he has the judgment against the person 
with whom he contracted for construction of the resi-
dence. We urge that the Court determine that the 
Reliance mortgage priority is ahead of the lien claim-
ant's rights and to that extent reverse the District 
Court's finding and judgment in this case. 
Respectfully submitted. 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & 
W.ATKISS 
600 El Paso N'atural Gas Building 
Salt (Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Reliance National 
Life Insurance Company 
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